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Abstract—Formal modelling is widely recognised to contribute
to the rigour and comprehensiveness of requirements. At the
same time, a formal specification does not offer the flexibility
and legibility of informal requirements, expected by system
designers and software engineers. In this paper we propose a
method and a supporting platform for tightly integrated co-
engineering of a requirements document and the corresponding
formal specification. We show that bi-directional transformation
between requirements and models affects the practice of require-
ments construction by, arguably, bringing additional rigour and
discipline while retaining the flexibility of informal requirements.
We report on the experience of applying the OSLC framework
to integrate a requirements engineering tool with the Rodin mod-
elling and verification environment. A prototype implementation
illustrates the main steps of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complexity of modern software-intensive systems and, in
particular, safety-critical systems is continuously growing. It
often makes testing of such systems to the desired degree of
reliability infeasible [1]. Consequently, developers are increas-
ingly relying on formal modelling techniques to verify system
correctness [2]. Growing maturity of automated tools makes
formal verification, including proof-based verification, more
accessible and attractive for industrial engineers [2]. Indeed,
proofs not only allow the developers to verify correctness of
models but also spot deficiencies and inconsistencies in the
requirements [3].
However, since models and requirements are often devel-
oped by different engineering teams, communication between
formal modelling and requirements engineering activities is
not straightforward [3]. To alleviate this problem, we propose
an integrated approach relying on a new industry-driven in-
teroperability standard – OSLC [4] – to enable automated co-
engineering of requirements and formal models in Event-B.
Event-B is a top-down state-based framework to formal
development [5]. Modelling in Event-B starts from creating
an abstract specification that captures the high-level system
functionality and properties. In a number of correctness-
preserving model transformations – refinements – the develop-
ers gradually elaborate on the specification to address lower-
level system requirements. Correctness of models and their
refinements in Event-B is verified by proofs. An integrated
extendable framework – Rodin platform [6] – provides an
automated support for formal development in Event-B.
Refinement is a methodology supporting structured rep-
resentation (and consequent validation) of requirements in
formal models [7]. However, it typically assumes that the
requirements are thoroughly described and classified before
the actual modelling starts. The developed models and proofs
then aim at confirming that the defined requirements are
indeed complete and consistent. Such a methodology does
not allow the engineers to fully exploit the benefits of formal
modelling [8].
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach that en-
ables and automates co-evolution of requirements and formal
models. In our work, the starting point is an informal high-
level description of the system behaviour. The incremental
definition of requirements proceeds concurrently with model
construction, while the conducted proofs verify each subset of
the defined requirements. As a result, spotted incompleteness
and inconsistencies immediately lead to correcting the require-
ments description as well as defining the missing requirements.
The process iteratively progresses until the desired level of
detail is reached.
By far and large, majority of requirements documents are
written in natural language [9]. In our approach, we aim
at retaining flexibility of the natural language requirements
description. Hence, to facilitate representation of the infor-
mally described requirements in formal models, we merely
provide the mapping guidelines, i.e., do not attempt to re-
strict the requirements representation. To maintain the link
between the dynamically changing requirements description
and the associated formal models, we have created a prototype
Requirements-Rodin adapter [10]. It relies on OSLC – Open
Services for Life Cycle Collaborations [4] – a newly intro-
duced open standard for integrated information engineering.
The standard allows the engineers to achieve inter-operability
between engineering tools by specifying the access to the
external resources of those tools as linked data [11], [12].
The proposed approach is illustrated by a case study – an
airlock control system. We demonstrate how the requirements
description and the associated Event-B models evolve through
their co-engineering and highlight the feedback provided by
the formalisation. The Requirements-Rodin adapter automates
creation and maintenance of an information continuum be-
tween the requirements engineering and Event-B modelling
activities.
We believe that the approach proposed in this paper ampli-
fies the benefits of formal modelling, improves communication
between different engineering teams and establishes common
information space in the engineering of complex systems.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the
essentials for formal modelling and verification in Event-B.
In Section III, we describe our approach to co-engineering
of requirements and formal models. Section IV demonstrates
the approach in detail by presenting a small case study –
an airlock control system. In Section V, we briefly overview
our chosen tool integration framework – OSLC. Section VI
presents our prototype implementation of the proposed tool
integration. Finally, in Section VII, we overview the related
work and give some concluding remarks.
II. MODELLING AND VERIFICATION IN EVENT-B
Event-B is a state-based formal approach that promotes
the correct-by-construction approach to system development
and formal verification by theorem proving. In Event-B, a
system model is specified using the notion of an abstract state
machine [5], [13]. An Abstract State Machine encapsulates
the model state, represented as a collection of variables, and
defines operations on the state, i.e., it describes the dynamic
behaviour of a modelled system. The variables are strongly
typed by the constraining predicates that together with other
important properties of the systems are defined in the model in-
variants. Usually, a machine has an accompanying component,
called context, which includes user-defined sets, constants and
their properties given as a list of model axioms.
A general form of Event-B models is given in Figure 1.
Machine M
Variables v
Invariants I
Events
Init
evt1
· · ·
evtN
−→
Context C
Carrier Sets d
Constants c
Axioms A
Fig. 1. Event-B machine and context
The machine is uniquely identified by its name M . The state
variables, v, are declared in the Variables clause and initialised
in the Init event. The variables are strongly typed by the
constraining predicates I given in the Invariants clause. The
invariant clause might also contain other predicates defining
properties (e.g., safety invariants) that should be preserved
during system execution.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a set of
atomic events. Generally, an event has the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, the
guard Ge is a predicate over the local variables of the event
and the state variables of the system. The body of an event is
defined by a multiple (possibly nondeterministic) assignment
over the system variables. In Event-B, an assignment repre-
sents a corresponding next-state relation Re. The guard defines
the conditions under which the event is enabled, i.e., its body
can be executed. If several events are enabled at the same time,
any of them can be chosen for execution nondeterministically.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach
to system development. Development starts from an abstract
specification that nondeterministically models the most es-
sential functional requirements. In a sequence of refinement
steps, we gradually reduce nondeterminism and introduce
detailed design decisions. In particular, we can add new events,
split events as well as replace abstract variables by their
concrete counterparts, i.e., perform data refinement. When
data refinement is performed, we define gluing invariants as a
part of the invariants of the refined machine. They define the
relationship between the abstract and concrete variables.
The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of
well-formedness and invariant preservation as well as correct-
ness of refinement steps, is demonstrated by discharging the
relevant verification conditions – proof obligations.
An Event-B model should satisfy a number of such proof
obligations. The most important class of them include invari-
ant preservation properties. More precisely, each event e of
the abstract Event-B model should preserve the given model
invariant I:
A(d, c), I(d, c, v), Ge(d, c, x, v), Re(d, c, x, v, v
′) ` I(d, c, v′)
(INV)
where A are model axioms, I are the model invariants, d and
c are model constants and sets respectively, x are the event’s
local variables and v, v′ are the variable values before and
after event execution.
Moreover, the invariant I must be established after model
initialisation:
A(d, c), RInit(d, c, v
′) ` I(d, c, v′) (INIT)
In turn, each refinement step generates additional proof
obligations ensuring that the transformation is performed in
a correctness-preserving way. For brevity, here we show only
a couple of the most essential ones, which we will use in the
paper.
Let a shorthand H(d, c, v, w) stands for the hypotheses
A(d, c), I(d, c, v), I ′(d, c, v, w), where I, I ′ are respectively
the abstract and refined invariants, and v, w are respectively the
abstract and concrete variables. The event guards in a refined
model can be only strengthened in a refinement step:
H(d, c, v, w), G′e(d, c, x, w) ` Ge(d, c, x, v) (REF GRD)
where ge, g′e are respectively the abstract and concrete guards
of the event e.
Moreover, the simulation refinement property requires to
show that the “execution” of a refined event is not contra-
dictory with its abstract version:
H(d, c, v, w), G′e(d, c, x, w), R
′
e(d, c, x, w,w
′)
` ∃v′ ·Re(d, c, x, v, v′) ∧ I ′(d, c, v′, w′) (REF SIM)
where Re, R′e are respectively the abstract and concrete next-
state relations of the same event evti.
The Rodin platform [6] provides an automated support for
formal modelling and verification in Event-B. In particular, it
automatically generates the required proof obligations and at-
tempts to discharge them. The remaining unproven conditions
can be dealt with by using the provided interactive provers.
Rodin is an open platform, modelling and verification in
which is enhanced by a number of extensions (plug-ins). The
extensions provide us with the different ways to represent
models. They also give us an access to various verification
engines (theorem provers, model checkers, SMT solvers).
For instance, model liveness properties may be expressed in
LTL/CTL and then verified in the associated model checker –
ProB, while model use cases can be represented graphically
and then translated into theorems to be proved by the Rodin
theorem proving engine. In the rest of the paper, we use Event-
B models as a frontend for a variety of models used in formal
verification.
III. CO-ENGINEERING OF REQUIREMENTS AND FORMAL
MODELS
A. Co-development process
In this section we present our general approach for require-
ments elicitation via co-engineering of a requirements and the
formal models in Event-B.
In his seminal book, Lamsweerde [9] introduces iterative
process of requirements engineering. In this process, each
iteration aims at improving quality of the requirements def-
inition by incorporating acquired knowledge of domain and
the system as well as the verification feedback. Our approach
follows the same idea and adopts it to align with the refinement
approach to formal modelling. We also slightly modify the
starting point of the requirements engineering process and
start from a conceptual requirement description that is made
detailed through the iterative co-development with formal
modelling. This process is similar to goal decomposition,
i.e., the initial iterations focus on defining and verifying
higher-level requirements, while the later iterations introduce
increasingly detailed requirements.
Each iteration of our approach consists of the following
steps :
• defining a subset of the requirements by deriving them
from a general system description or by elaborating on
the higher-level requirements;
• formalising these requirements as an Event-B model or
refinement of more abstract model;
• attempting to verify by proofs logical consistency of the
model;
• modifying the model, if necessary, by, e.g., adding ad-
ditional invariants or constraints, to make the models
provably correct;
• reflecting model modifications in the requirements defi-
nition by adding missing requirements or correcting the
defined ones;
• repeating the process ...
Essentially, our approach proposes structured requirement
elicitation, which is aligned with top-down refinement of
formal models in Event-B. In other words, the development
of a requirements document and the related formal models
proceeds hand-in-hand – changes in one are reflected in the
other and vice versa. Every time when the requirements engi-
neers define a new subset of requirements in the requirements
document, formalisation of this subset is triggered in the
verification team. Verification of the created formal models
often necessitates the model changes, i.e., spots problems
with the introduced subsset of the requirements. In its turn, it
triggers changes in the requirements definition – the missing
requirements are added or erroneous are corrected. Such a pro-
cess can be seen as as ”proof-driven” requirements discovery.
To facilitate co-engineering of the requirements description
and the formal models, we define recommendations on how
to map the requirements onto the associated model elements.
Our mapping helps to ensure that each informal requirement
is reflected by a certain modelling artefact or a group of them.
On the other hand, every modelling decision must be justified
from the requirements point of view.
In our approach, we co-align requirements definition and
formal modelling processes in such a way that more concrete
requirements are mapped onto refined, i.e., more detailed
formal models, while the hierarchical relationships between
requirements become specific verification conditions between
the corresponding formal models. As a result, the hierarchical
requirement development process is aligned with the formal
refinement structure.
The hierarchical development approach results in spreading
representation of the requirements over a number of different
models. Different nature of the requirements would motivate
the engineering to choose the formalisation that enables the
most efficient verification (e.g., theorem proving, model check-
ing or SMT solving). We believe that such a flexibility is
beneficial for the requirements engineering process.
The Fig.2 graphically portrays the proposed co-engineering
approach to requirements definition and formal modelling. The
arrows represent interactions between the requirements elicita-
tion and model development/verification. Moreover, depicts
here requirement elicitation or specification development;
is the specification proof effort following a specification
change; represents the integration activity where model
changes are reconciled with requirements (typically resulting
in new added requirements); finally, depicts parallel refine-
ment of requirements and the associated model(s), which may
lead to introducing new refined model elements as well as
adding the new detailed requirements descriptions.
B. Construction of the mapping between requirements and
formal models
To facilitate the proposed co-engineering process, we de-
fine the recommendations for mapping requirements onto
the formal models. In general, unambiguous translation of
textual requirements into the corresponding elements of formal
methods, i.e., a formalisation of requirements, is a challenging
unresolved problem. In the related work section, we overview
various approaches to achieve it.
requirements specification
Fig. 2. Requirements and specification developed in parallel
In our approach, we rely on our extensive expertise in
Event-B modelling that resulted in creating classification of the
requirements and defining the guidelines for their modelling
[14]. The most typical requirements can be classified as safety
requirements (SRs) about global system properties, require-
ments about flow of control (i.e., order of function execution),
termination conditions, temporal properties etc.
Formally, the mapping is a function, FM , of the type:
FM : Reqs → P(MElem)
where P(T ) stands for all possible subsets of the type T ,
and MElem represents all possible model elements. In other
words, a single requirement is mapped to a set (collection)
of model elements. Here model elements are referable el-
ements of Event-B formal models, such as model axioms,
variables, invariants, theorems, model events, event guards and
actions, etc. Moreover, the associated model expressions such
as LTL/CTL formulas used for model checking or use case
diagrams to be verified are also considered as model elements
that can be referred to.
As mentioned above, requirements from different classes
may be mapped (translated) into the associated formal model
in differing ways. For instance, a fragment of the mapping
SR1 7→ {safety inv2, safety inv3}
associates the safety requirement labeled SR1 with the cor-
responding model invariants, labeled as safety inv2 and
safety inv3. The requirement label here refers to the associated
textual requirement description, while the invariant labels refer
to specific logical sequents (theorems) to be proved for a
model to ensure that the safety property is preserved.
In general, the following guidelines for constructing the
mapping have been tested to work in practice:
1) the requirements expressing safety properties are trans-
lated into safety invariants or event guards (pre-
conditions) of the related formal models;
2) liveness properties become LTL/CTL temporal proper-
ties to be verified by the associated model checker;
3) system properties are represented by state transitions
(model events) as well as guards or post-conditions (the
constructed theorems) of those events;
4) the requirements expressing sequential properties (such
as the desired system control flow) and use cases become
theorems on the event order to be verified;
5) design decisions become either model events or guards
or post-conditions of particular events.
In all cases, new model variables may be also introduced. If
the mapping relates a requirement with such artefact as an
invariant, a theorem, or an LTL/CTL formula, its verification
gives us immediate proving feedback on the requirement. In
other cases, like adding new events or variables, we rely on
the underlying Event-B proof semantics (i.e., the pre-defined
proof obligations for model consistency and refinement) to
provide such a feedback. We will demonstrate building of a
concrete mapping between a requirements documents and the
corresponding Event-B models on a case study in Section IV.
We require certain consistency (well-formedness) conditions
to be fulfilled by a constructed mapping. First, we expect
mapping to be total and surjective, which means that any
requirement is mapped to some model elements, while any
model element is associated with at least one informal require-
ment. The consistency of hierarchical structures of require-
ments and model refinements must be also respected: more
concrete requirements must be mapped onto more concrete
refined models. Mathematically, this means that a mapping is
an order preserving transformation between the corresponding
data structures.
C. Tool support
Development of the requirements engineering field shows
that it is critical to ensure flexibility in the requirements elici-
tation process [9]. Therefore, while devising the tool support
for the proposed approach, we aim at creating a platform for
collaborative yet non-restrictive co-engineering. Our goal is
to establish an information continuum between two teams: the
team of domain experts working on the requirements document
and the verification experts responsible for construction and
verification of formal models. The desired integration should
be loose and non-intrusive, i.e., should support the existing
modus operandi in each of the teams. However, the integration
should also enable highly-interactive collaboration, i.e., trigger
the actions on each side by exposing the relevant information
to the engineers.
OSLC [4] – Open Services for Lifecycle Collaboration
– provides the means for such a kind of integration. In
its essence, OSLC ensures interoperability between arbitrary
engineering tools by specifying a number of constraints that
resources, which are externally exposed by the tools, must
preserve and a basic protocol allowing for the tools to integrate
their activities on these resources.
In the next section, we will demonstrate our approach by
a case study – an airlock control system. Then in Section V
we will overview the OSLC integration framework in more
detail, before briefly discussing (in Section VI) our OSLC-
based prototype implementation illustrating the proposed tool
integration.
External
environment Airlock
chamber
Internal
environment
Door 1 Door 2
Door motor
Pressure sensors
Door closed sensor
Door opened sensor
Door position sensor
Fig. 3. The airlock system
IV. APPROACH DEMONSTRATION: AN AIRLOCK CONTROL
SYSTEM
We illustrate the approach with a case study of an airlock
system control. The main function of the airlock is to separate
two areas with different air pressures and allow users to pass
safely between the areas (see Fig. 3).
For clarity, let us call the two conjoining areas as external
(the left area) and internal (the right one). Let us also assume
that the pressure outside is lower than inside. In order to allow
a user to pass from inside through the airlock into the external
area, the system needs to perform the following steps:
• equalise the chamber pressure to that of the internal
environment,
• open the second door to allow the user into the chamber,
• close the second door,
• equalise the pressure in the airlock to that of the external
environment,
• open the first door to let the user out.
Moreover, the opposite (dual) scenario needs to be performed
to allow the user pass from outside through the airlock into
the external area.
The system is equipped with a number of actuators - door
motors, a pressure pump, as well as sensors - pressure sensors,
door positions sensors and buttons. Our goal is to develop
control software that would allow a human operator to safely
pass through the airlock. In the scope of this demonstration
we focus exclusively on safety and liveness properties of
the developed system, leaving aside issues of its usability,
operation speed, reliability and maintainability.
We can describe these (given above) assumptions about
the environment of the system as the following high-level
requirements:
ENV1. The airlock system separates two different
environments. The pressure of the external envi-
ronment is lower than that of the internal one.
ENV2. In order to maintain different pressures, the two
environments must be physically separated.
The primary function of the system is to allow an operator
to travel between internal and external environments.
FUN1. When in operation, the airlock system must
be able to let users pass safely between the two
environments via the airlock.
At this stage we switch to the specification part of our
approach and try to capture the purpose of the system as
an abstract Event-B model. We are going to follow the top-
down development methodology where a well-chosen abstrac-
tion ”frames” the further model refinement steps, while the
refinement proof obligations suggest missing model elements.
Hence, we initially abstract away of the notion of airlock as a
pair doors and represent it as a monolithic door-like entity. In
this way we can also omit details of the airlock chamber and
pressure control, only to introduce them later as refinements
of both requirements and associated formal models.
The sole phenomenon we capture in the abstract machine
m0 is the movement of a human operator between the external
and internal environments. This succinctly, in an abstract form,
encodes the requirements ENV1, ENV2, and FUN1.
The location of a user is represented by model variable user
defined to be an element an enumerated set USER POS0:
inv1 : user ∈ USER POS0
where USER POS0 is defined in the accompanying model
context c0 as
axm1 : USER POS0 = { OUT, IN}.
We satisfy FUN1 by defining events (state transitions)
modelling the movement of a user between the environments:
go in , when user = OUT then user := IN end
go out , when user = IN then user := OUT end
Model consistency proof obligations [5] require that every
model variable is initialised, possibly non-deterministically,
establishing the given invariant (for details, see the proof
obligation (INIT) in Section II). To satisfy this, we must
make a decision where the human operator may be initially
located. It is clear from the description that it could be either
environment and hence the following initialisation statement
is introduced.
INITIALISATION , begin user :∈ USER POS0 end
The initialisation action user :∈ USER POS0 is then
translated into a new requirement FUN2, thus adding to the
overall list of requirements.
FUN2. A human operator may initiate airlock use from
inside or outside environments.
On top of requirements document and Event-B model we
must also maintain a consistent mapping relation between
requirements. As a result of the co-development presented so
far, we constructed the following mapping:
ENV1 → c0/axm1
ENV2 → c0/axm1, m0/inv1
FUN1 → m0/go in , m0/go out
FUN2 ← m0/INITIALISATION
The overall co-engineering process for the conducted case
study is graphically portrayed in Fig. 4.
A. First refinement
As the next step, we shall introduce an airlock abstraction
that operates much like a simple door. Its role here is to capture
the high-level protocol of airlock operation, namely, the three
principal airlock modes: awaiting a command, operating in
the left-to-right mode, and operating in the right-to-left mode.
In the requirements document, we introduce the following
(abstract) requirements:
FUN3. Environments are separated by an airlock.
FUN4. Airlock has operation modes: ALWAIT, ALIN,
ALOUT.
We also elaborate on the abstract requirement FUN2 with
the following statement:
FUN5(FUN2). Airlock is initially in the ALWAIT mode.
In the specification part, we introduce a new refinement step
– (refinement machine m1 ) to signify that the existing abstrac-
tion is extended with a new phenomena. In this refinement, the
airlock state is modelled by a new variable, alck, defining the
current airlock mode, as prescribed by the requirement FUN4.
inv1 : alck ∈ AIRLOCK STATE
The requirement FUN5 is reflected in the following new
initialisation statement:
INITIALISATION , begin act2 : alck := ALWAIT end
At the basic level, the airlock behaviour model must cover
the transitioning between the three airlock modes. This results
in the following new specification events.
airlock operate ,
when alck = ALWAIT then alck :∈ {ALIN,ALOUT} end
airlock done ,
when alck 6= ALWAIT then alck := ALWAIT end
The events elaborate upon the requirement FUN5 and
are mapped back into two new requirements, elaborating on
FUN5:
FUN6(FUN5). The airlock may be switched to ALIN or
ALOUT mode.
FUN7(FUN5). The airlock may be switched to
ALWAIT mode.
The model makes it clear that the airlock behaviour must be
harmonised with user movement. We simply state that when
the user is moving between locations, the airlock is put in
the corresponding mode. For instance, the case when the user
moves inside is addressed by adding new guard alck = ALIN:
go in , when · · · ∧ grd2 : alck = ALIN then . . . end
The correctness of event refinement is verified by discharging
the associated proof obligations for guard strengthening and
event simulation (see Section II).
The two new guards are translated to new symmetric
requirements.
FUN8(FUN1). A user may travel to IN only when
airlock is in the ALIN mode.
FUN9(FUN1). A user may travel to OUT only when
airlock is in the ALOUT mode.
requirements Event-B model
ENV1 
FUN2 
m0/INITIALISATION/act1 
FUN3 
FUN4 
FUN5 
FUN6 
FUN7 
m1/airlock_operate, m1/airlock_done
m1/go_in/grd2, m1/go_out/grd2FUN8 
FUN9 
ENV3 
FUN10 
m2/inv5, m2/inv6
FUN11 - 
- FUN15 
ENV2
FUN1 
Fig. 4. Requirements and model co-engineering time line.
Here we have a new situation where requirements detali-
sation proceeds alongside with formal model requirement. In
this case, the refinement was induced by the specification part
although in general it can be initiated from either side. To em-
phasise that detalisation and refinement are tightly interlinked,
on the diagram in Fig. 4 we show the corresponding step as
a joint action (the chessboard pattern).
To summarise, during this stage of co-development we
have extended the mapping relation with the following links
between requirements and the associated model elements:
FUN3 → m1/alck
FUN4 → m1/inv1
FUN5 → m1/INITIALISATION /act2
FUN6 ← m1/airlock operate
FUN7 ← m1/airlock done
FUN8 ↔ m1/go in/grd2
FUN9 ↔ m1/go out/grd2
B. Second refinement
A natural way to continue from this point is to refine
the abstract airlock into a more concrete (but still idealised)
concept of a pair of doors operated in accord. Since formal
refinement imposes fairly strict formal constraints between
models, this could lead to synthesising a number of new
requirements in the process.
First, we state that the airlock is made of two doors.
ENV3. The system has two doors and a chamber.
Each door when closed separates the chamber
from the appropriate environment.
We also add obvious requirements that the doors may be
operated.
FUN10. An open door may be closed; a closed door
may be opened.
At the specification side, we once again make a new
refinement step, resulting in the refined machine m2 ). This
step is necessary since we are going to remove the abstract
notion of airlock and replace it with a pair of doors. We start
by representing the doors as following model variables
inv1 : door1 ∈ DOOR
inv2 : door2 ∈ DOOR
where DOOR is a constant set (defined in the model context
c2 ) made of two literals OPEN and CLOSED.
The requirement FUN10 is mapped into four model events.
For instance, the opening of door1 is specified as follows:
door1 open ,
when door1 = CLOSED then act1 : door1 := OPEN end
The events door2 open , door1 close and door2 close are
defined in a similar manner.
Since the airlock abstraction disappears, so does the vari-
able alck . Consequently, the events airlock operate and
airlock done as well as the guard mentioning alck may
no longer be present in the model. Instead, we must show
formally that the abstract airlock concept is now refined by
the two doors model.
In particular, we have to show that new door events
are refinements of their abstract counterparts. The event
door1 open refines the abstract event airlock operate for the
case of alck = ALOUT, while door2 open covers the case of
alck = ALIN. Both door closing events refine airlock done .
The event refinement leads to a number of action simulation
and guard strengthening proof obligations (for details, see
Section II), which in this case cannot be proven straight away.
A failure to prove these proof obligations automatically
suggests adding the following two new safety invariants:
inv5 : ¬ (door1 = OPEN ∧ door2 = OPEN)
inv6 : door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED⇔ alck = ALWAIT
These are sufficient to prove event refinement and, as a
result, they are reflected back in the requirements documents
as new requirements
FUN11. door1 and door2 may not be open at the
same time.
FUN12. When both doors are closed, the airlock is in
the waiting mode.
Note that we do not need to completely precise in the natural
language descriptions of requirements as the supporting spec-
ification may be consulted to clarify the statement meaning.
The new invariants also require changes to some of the
existing events. In particular, a failed proof obligation of
invariant preservation of inv5 : by door1 open suggests the
following new guard:
door1 open ,
when · · · ∧ grd2 : door2 = CLOSED then . . . end
with a symmetric case for door2 open .
Finally, there is still the matter of event referring to alck in
event guards of go in and go out . These are now refined into
door2 = OPEN for go in and door1 = OPEN for go out
with the additional invariant conditions (necessary to carry out
the proof) relating the airlock operation mode with the current
user position and door states:
inv3 : user = OUT ∧ door2 = OPEN⇒ alck = ALIN
inv4 : user = IN ∧ door1 = OPEN⇒ alck = ALOUT
All these guard changes yield three new requirements:
FUN13(FUN11). A door may be opened only when
both doors are currently closed.
FUN14(FUN8). A user may move inside only when
door2 is open.
FUN15(FUN9). A user may move outside only when
door1 is open.
These changes conclude the current refinement step. As
a result, the mapping relation is now extended with the
following links.
ENV3 → m2/inv1, m2/inv2 :
FUN10 → m2/door1 open ,
m2/door1 close , ...
FUN11 ← m2/inv5
FUN12 ← m2/inv6
FUN13 ← m2/door1 open/grd2, m0/door2 open/grd2
FUN14 ← m2/go in/grd2
FUN15 ← m2/go out/grd2
FUN8 ← m2/inv3
FUN9 ← m2/inv6
Note that the requirements FUN8 - FUN9 are not added
at this stage but rather new mapping links are inserted to
reflect the fact that refinement-induced invariants m2/inv3 and
m2/inv4 now support the previously introduced requirements.
C. Third refinement
Although the airlock is made of two doors, the user view-
point of airlock operation is still abstract: to travel through
the airlock one needs to open a suitable door then, in a single
instance, move in or out. The model and requirements abstract
away pressure equalisation and operation of the second door.
In the new refinement step we refine airlock operation with
the notions of a middle chamber and explicit operation of
both doors. First, we add requirements that the airlock must
be visited when using the airlock:
FUN16. User moves from U OUT to U MID IN.
FUN17. User moves from U OUT to U MID IN.
This translates to the following new events:
go mid in ,
when
userpos = U OUT ∧ door1 = OPEN
then
userpos := MID
end
go mid out , when ... then ... end
To relate the in/out position to the in/middle/out, we put the
following invariant statements in the model:
inv2 : userpos ∈ {U IN,U MID OUT}⇔ user = IN
inv3 : userpos ∈ {U OUT,U MID IN}⇔ user = OUT
All of the model changes above translate into adding a
liveness requirement
LIV1. Starting in an external environment, a user
always succeeds in travelling to the internal envi-
ronment.
and a symmetric requirement LIV2 for moving in the opposite
direction. These are translated into the following LTL state-
ments over the machine states that are forwarded to be verified
by the associated Event-B model checker – Pro-B:
G({userpos = U IN}⇒ F{userpos = U OUT})
G({userpos = U OUT}⇒ F{userpos = U IN})
The model checker verification yields several counter-
examples, which consequently leads to several model cor-
rections. In turn, new concrete requirements are added to
the requirements document. All in all, this step introduces
nine new functional requirements synthesised during model
validation. For the lack of space, we omit here the detailed
descriptions of these requirements and the appended mapping
between them and the related model elements.
The presented case study illustrates our proposed co-
engineering approach. However, to improve its applicabil-
ity and usability, we need tools supporting integrated co-
engineering work of different developer teams. In the next
section we present the basis for such tool integration – the
OSLC framework.
V. OSLC
Open Services for Lifecycle Collaboration (OSLC) [4] is
an open community, the main goal of which is to create
specifications for integrating tools, their data and workflows in
support of lifecycle processes. OSLC is organised into work-
groups that address integration scenarios for individual topics
such as change management, test management, requirements
management and configuration management. Such topics are
called OSLC domains. Each workgroup explores integration
scenarios for a given domain and specifies a common vocabu-
lary for the lifecycle artefacts needed to support the scenarios.
In very simple terms, OSLC specifications focus on how the
external resources of a particular tool can be accessed, browsed
over, and specific change requests can be made. OSLC is not
trying to standardise the behaviour or capability of any tool.
Instead, OSLC specifies a minimum amount of protocol and
a small number of resource types to allow two different tools
to work together relatively seamlessly.
To ensure coherence and integration across these domains,
each workgroup builds on the concepts and rules defined
in the OSLC Core specification [15]. OSLC Core consists
mostly of standard rules and patterns for using HTTP and RDF
(Resource Description Framework) that all the domains must
adopt in their specifications. It also defines a small number of
resource types that help tools to integrate their activities.
In OSLC, each artefact in the lifecycle – a requirement, test
case, source file etc. – is an HTTP resource that is manipulated
using the standard methods of the HTTP specification (GET,
PUT, POST, DELETE). Each resource has its RDF represen-
tation, which allows statements about resources (in particular
web resources) in the form of subject/predicate/object expres-
sions, i.e., as linked data. OSLC also supports representations
in other formats, like JSON or HTML.
The central organising concept of OSLC is ServiceProvider,
enabling tools to expose resources and allowing consumers to
navigate to all of the resources, and create new ones. Two
fundamental properties of a ServiceProvider are:
1) oslc:creation: the URL of a resource to which you can
POST representations to create new resources.
2) oslc:queryBase: the URL of a resource that you can GET
to obtain a list of existing resources.
ServiceProviders have a third important property – dialog,
describing invocation of HTML web user interface dialogs of
one tool by another.
a) Requirements in OSLC: OSLC Requirements Man-
agement (RM) [11] specification is built on the top of the
OSLC Core specification. It supports key REST APIs for
software Requirements Management systems. The additionally
specified properties of OSLC-RM describe the requirements-
related resources and the relationships between them.
The meaning of Requirement resource properties are defined
in a separate table, together with their multiplicity constraints.
Requirement resource properties are not limited to the ones
defined in this specification, as Service Providers may provide
additional properties. A small excerpt from this table from the
OSLC-RM specification is given on Fig.5.
Using the pre-defined properties in OSLC-RM we can struc-
ture the requirements exposed by a requirements management
tool, as well as link them with one or several model elements
exposed by the associated verification/validation (Rodin). The
overall protocol of tool integration is specified by the OSLC
Core specification.
b) Implementation and tool support: There are several
different approaches to implementing an OSLC provider for
software. For this work, we rely on so called the Adapter
approach. It proposes to create a new web application that acts
as an OSLC Adapter, runs along-side of the target application,
provides OSLC support and ”under the hood” makes calls to
the application web APIs to create, retrieve, update and delete
external resources.
Eclipse Lyo is an SDK to help the Eclipse community adopt
OSLC specifications and build OSLC-compliant tools. In the
next section we will discuss our small prototype implementa-
tion (using Eclipse Lyo) of OSLC-based integration between
a custom-built requirements management tool and the Rodin
platform, supporting our co-engineering approach.
VI. TOOLING PLATFORM
The success of the proposed methodology critically depends
on the way the dynamics of a development process is affected.
Requirement elicitation relies on tight collaboration between
domain experts, stakeholders and developers. A requirements
document itself serves a concrete medium for communication
among these. Putting a formal specification in the midst of
this process is likely to negatively affect this communication
as most engineers are unused to reading mathematical nota-
tion. Hence, from the outset, we were looking for the ways
incorporate formal reasoning without disrupting the existing
practice of requirements engineering. This means, for instance,
that the current tool chain must be preserved and only new
side-branches may appear.
The first challenge is to gain access to requirements. For
this we rely on a growing trend for interoperable tools. In this
work we used the OSLC framework which seems to be rapidly
gaining momentum and is backed by a number of large soft-
ware engineering companies. The role of OSLC is to expose
requirements (and, symmetrically, models) in way that enables
other tools to traverse, pull and link, via stable global resource
identifiers, to individual requirements or their sub-elements.
In its essence, an OSLC-adapted toolset exposes its relevant
Fig. 5. Excerpt from OSLC-RM resource properties
data as a hierarchical catalogue of objects. The lifetime of a
catalogue and its individual elements depends on a tool and,
especially, on the kind of data being exposed. In an extreme
case, a resource describing a random number generator would
change with every read access. More typically, in the context
of requirements and software, a resource undergoes periods
of rapid changes and then stays stable until the end of the
development cycle.
As a prototype experiment, we have developed our own
requirements tool. It uses the generic principle of require-
ments organised into a tree with further optional cross-links
between requirements, and their classifications (by taxonomy,
component, developer, etc.). The tool provides a simple form-
based UI and, we believe, is a reasonable approximation of
some of the more popular industrial tools. The key aspects
is that it embeds a web-service that serves OSLC-compliant
RDF descriptions of requirements. Every requirement may be
referred to by the project name and requirement id:
host : port/〈project-name〉/〈requirement-name〉
The link is ”live” for as long as a requirement is present,
otherwise a report is generated detailing whether the require-
ments existed at all and, if it did, when it was removed.
The second part of the prototype achieves a similar goal for
the Rodin Platform. We have developed a Rodin plug-in that
exposes the Event-B model database and proofs as externally
referable OSLC resources. Once again, every distinguished
model element (variable, invariant, refinement) has a unique
global identifiers that can be used to cross-link with other
OSLC and RDF resources.
Exposition of internal data as OSLC is only the static
part of intended collaboration. One needs to make kinds of
tools – for requirements and modelling – aware of each,
make them react on respective changes and exchange relevant
information when changes are made. One way to bring such
dynamics would be have a form of the peer-to-peer connection
architecture for every connection, where both parts maintain
a server and a client. There are some practical reasons not
go this route. One is the that the network address translation
widely used to manage TCP/IP networks and connections to
the Internet do not easily allow opening a connection from a
client to a server. In fact, the dominating network architecture
presupposes that connections are always initiated from local
networks to dedicated servers. This has forced us to use
a centralised approach where a single publisher/subscriber
event server is managing all the collaborating tools. in this
implementation, individual tools connect to a cloud hosted
server to either create a new collaborative project or join an
existing one. Then, within a project context, all the the project
members can subscribe to and publish resource updates.
From the user perspective, the requirements editor can
be crossed linked manually to some model elements. Such
cross-links also appear when another user working on the
specification part inserts a cross link to the requirements.
We use the OSLC creation functionality to allow engineers
to insert model elements from requirements and vice versa.
In the former case, the user can only choose the kind of a
target element and its location in a model. Then an empty
model element of a required type appears in the model with
an embedded cross-link to the requirements. This functionality
enables tight collaboration between members of a development
team even when they are unable to communicate directly.
Instructions on how to use the developed OSLC adapter for
the Rodin platform can be found in [10]. The adapter adds an
embedded http server (jetty) and implements, with the help of
the Lyo framework and Apache Wink, a RESTful java servlet
that provides access to the Rodin projects and models.
VII. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Related work
The main goal of requirements engineering is to derive
structured, complete and consistent set of requirements, which
forms the basis for further system development. Often this is
achieved via formal modelling and verification. Consequently,
the research on methodologies for translating informal require-
ments into formal specifications is vast. One strand of the
research relies on natural language processing [16] to auto-
matically extract formal specifications. Another strand focuses
on structuring requirements to facilitate their formalisation.
Fraser et al. [17] are pioneers in this area. They proposed
guidelines for developing VDM specifications from structured
analysis of requirements. Giese et al [18] demonstrated how
to relate informal requirements in the form of UML use cases
to formal representation in OCL. The most prominent work
in this area is the KAOS framework [9], [19]. KAOS is a
goal-oriented framework that aims at formalising hierarchy of
goals and corresponding sub-goals in Linear Temporal Logic.
Another intensifying strand of research relies on ontologies
for imposing a structure on informal requirements and then
proposing patterns for translating them [20].
Our research builds on the results of this work emphasis-
ing, however, a co-engineering approach. Firstly, we take a
different point of departure and start from an informal high-
level system description, i.e., without attempting to restrict the
form of the requirements representation or define a structure
over them. Secondly, we propose to define requirements in
small increments and immediately verify them. Therefore, our
approach supports shorter iterations of requirements elicitation
and checking.
An initial approach to bridge requirements to specification
in the context of the B Method have aimed at relating
KAOS operations with B operations and defining properties
as invariants of the specification [21]. Further development in
this area has continued along providing a formalisation of the
requirements defined as hierarchy of goals to Event-B [22].
This work focused on establishing traceability and facilitating
formalisation without attempting to support co-development.
Moreover, the authors do not rely on refinement and, hence,
building large-scale models would likely be problematic.
B. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach to
requirements elicitation. It is based on co-development of
requirements description and the associated formal models.
The approach is supported by a prototype tool based on the
new industry-driven standard for tool integration – OSLC. In
our work, we aimed at providing both requirements engineer-
ing and formal modelling teams with flexibility and highly
interactive development environment. Requirements engineers
incrementally introduce definitions of the requirements. This is
reflected in the corresponding refinements of the formal model.
Proof-based verification provides a quick feedback leading to
requirements adjustment. In such an approach, the role of
proofs is enhanced to guide development of the requirements.
Our approach is supported by the Requirements-Rodin
adapter – a prototype tool that creates integrated information
environment using linked data. The prototype relies on the
OSLC standard that enables tool integration by specifying
access to external tool resources. Since it allows for integration
between arbitrary tools (open source or proprietary) and is
agnostic to the implementation platform, it can support any
automated environment for requirements engineering.
The proposed approach established an information contin-
uum between requirements engineering and formal modelling.
Its iterative and interactive nature enables tight co-operation
between diverse teams and fits modern agile development
technologies.
In this paper, we have reported on the methodology and
the prototype tool development. To evaluate the proposed ap-
proach, we are currently setting an industrial pilot. Collecting
the feedback and refining the proposed approach constitute our
next steps.
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